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The end of the Cold War in 1990 led many observers East and
West to conclude that the major divides in the world had been closed.
The 75-year-old battle between revolution and stasis, and the 45-year-old
battle between the two Empires and the two worlds, had come to a close.
With closure on the Cold War, a number of things happened. One of
them, of course, was the unification of Germany. No doubt, the
unification, or re-unification, of Germany was one development that
made possible the seminars in Leipzig and in Miami, which in turn
provided the opportunity for the production of the work appearing in this
volume. More specifically the Universities of Miami and Leipzig were
able in the post-cold-war world to inaugurate a joint seminar that would
have escaped them, and did escape them, in the preceding period. In the
course of the German university reform and expansion of the 1990's, the
University of Leipzig, often in the past a center of great learning in the
sciences and social sciences, also expanded its law faculty and its law
offerings. Likewise, but in a very different way, the University of Miami
in the 1990's was able to develop from a provincial university with a few
venues of excellence into a significant and serious research institution.
The law school of the university is a significant beneficiary of that
development. This dual development in Leipzig and in Miami made
possible the introduction and popularity of the exchange seminar
between the two faculties and their students.
In May of 2001, faculty members and students from the
University of Miami School of Law went to historic Leipzig to exchange
views with German faculty members and students. That exchange was
reciprocated in March of 2002 by a visit and discussion with members of
the faculty and student body from Leipzig in sunny Miami. Those two
occasions produced the papers presented in this volume. This is an
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. Co-Director of the
University of Miami-University of Leipzig Bi-National Conference. Special
thanks to my colleagues and Co-Directors Richard Williamson, Professor of
Law, University of Miami School of Law, and Rudolph Geiger, Professor of
Law, University of Leipzig. This conference would not have been possible
without their efforts.
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entirely welcome development, both as an intellectual matter and as a
matter of cultural exchange.
As the subject matter of the papers contained here amply
demonstrates however, there is far more going on than study abroad. The
end of the Cold War produced unanticipated changes in the legal and
political structures of the world. Many observers expected, perhaps
naively, that with the abandonment of the effort at socialist development
represented by the Soviet Union, the competing and opposing model,
represented by the United States and its rather unregulated capitalism,
would simply triumph and present an unchallenged Weltanschauung,
which the rest of the world would willingly and to its own great benefit
adopt. Although it is certainly true that free market liberalism has in the
past dozen years spread its wings or, in the view of some, cast its shadow
world wide, the matter in Europe itself has proven more complicated.
Europe is, as Americans sometimes forget, home to the leading and most
ancient western civilization. It has proven far from easy for Frenchmen,
Germans, Italians, Britons, and others to accept unchallenged American
leadership or as some might see it, domination. So, ironically, our
Leipzig-Miami exchange has taken place in the shadow of considerable
debate and disagreement between the leaderships and citizenries of our
two respective countries.
The first years after 1990 were, arguably at least, dominated by a
certain innocent optimism, which blocked out any perception of the
differences in interests between European countries and the United
States. Likewise the second half of the 1990's saw a particular
conjuncture of social democratic governments in Europe and Democratic
governments in the United States. The social democratic and statist
traditions of Europeans-Catholic, red, and green-seemed able to co-
exist with the liberal and libertarian impulses of America. This changed
dramatically in the year 2000 with the election in the United States of
President George W. Bush. Given the much more conservative and
hegemonialist orientation of the Bush government, it is not surprising
that differences would develop between the United States and its
European partners and allies. Undoubtedly the question marks that
continue to hover over President Bush's election, and indeed over the
legitimacy of his presidency, have for many Europeans grown rather than
receded in the two years since. Differences between American and
German governing elites are visible in both macro political matters --
namely a vastly different view of the relationship of individual States to
the world system -- and in the micro issues, that is to say in the treatment
of specific individual issues that have arisen in the relationships among
the countries. The looming threat of war exacerbates anxieties about one-
VOL. 10
FOREWORD
sided partnerships and makes many Europeans wish they could more
effectively challenge Washington. Chancellor Schroeder has made that
clear.
The central issue dividing the United States under its current
leadership from its European allies is, namely, the relationship between
uni-lateralism and multi-lateralism in today's world. The United States is
the only hegemon in the world today, of that there is no doubt. The
question however, remains whether that hegemon should proceed
unilaterally and as it wishes in its dealings with others; the question is
whether that sole hegemon should flex and use its muscles as it sees fit;
the question is whether the absence of a challenge to the United States
should in turn lead the United States to act in the world without
consultation, without consideration, and without deference to the needs
of others. The Europeans for the most part believe in multi-lateralism
because they are the "multies", that is to say, they are the ones who are
included when the United States does not act alone, but they are
themselves not really capable of acting alone, not even on the European
continent, let alone elsewhere in the world. This conflict between the
power politics of an unchallenged hegemon, and the multilateral, more
human-rights oriented politics of western multi-lateralism, occupies the
backdrop behind all of the specific issues discussed at our two sessions at
Leipzig and in Miami, as well as a backdrop for the papers collected in
this volume.
Let us now turn to the individual papers presented in this volume
and the issues they seek to address.
Mamedov Muschwig of Leipzig and Jeff Cazeau of Miami open
the volume with a discussion of European security and defense policy as
organized around the ESDI, European Security and Defense Initiative or
European Security and Defense Identity. The issue underlying their
debate is whether the European nations can function as a significant
military power on their own, that is independently or semi-independently
of NATO. NATO has from its inception been an American-led, if not an
American-dominated, collective security instrument. This understanding
made significant sense and was tolerable to the European partners so
long as the major threats in the world were of two sorts: a major
confrontation between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, or
brush fires on the periphery of the conflict between the Soviet Union and
the U.S. or between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The 1990's, however,
witnessed to the surprise of many, conflicts within the European
continent. Above all, the dissolution of Yugoslavia generated a series of
conflicts known in Bosnia and in Kosovo, where European interests
seemed to be much more directly implicated than American interests. In
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addition, the dissolution of Yugoslavia generated a number of human-
rights claims, claims that seemed to transcend the limits of mere power
politics or interest politics, and to implicate larger doctrines of
nationality rights, the sovereignty of small groups, etc.
The experience of the post-Yugoslav wars is a mixed one. It
seemed that the European states were themselves not able to administer
and handle the problem effectively. From the American perspective,
Europe remains an economic powerhouse with little if any military
muscle, organization or desire. From the European point of view, it
seems impossible to organize local collective security devices without
either inviting the United States to participate or without being muscled
aside by the United States. The problems that this uncertainty causes
between the United States and its European partners within the
framework of NATO and beyond it are the topics of the discussion by
Muschwig and Cazeau. Each of them pays generous heed to the
perspective of the other, and their exchange is both enlightening and an
exercise in close legal thinking. Whether in the end it is possible to
establish a European Security and Defense Policy, ESDP, or not, remains
to be seen. For the moment, it seems that our military attention has again
been drawn away from Europe itself and to the near and middle East.
Ongoing conflict in Russian Chechnya reminds us that Russia is not and
will not in any conceivable future become a member of NATO, and
therein lies the limit of these discussions. Russia is a member of Europe,
but not a member of NATO. This dilemma is perhaps in the long run
more significant than the disjunction between the interest of the NATO
partners on the two sides of the Atlantic.
Manuel Rodriguez of Miami and Runa Kinzel of Leipzig next
discuss the issue of the Helms-Burton Act and the extension of the
ongoing U.S. embargo of Cuba. The U.S. has maintained a boycott of
Cuba virtually since Fidel Castro secured the Communist regime there.
This boycott has never made much sense to Europeans or other Latin
Americans who know very well that the lack of internal democracy
rarely functions as a basis for external boycott. Nonetheless, in the
United States, and especially in Miami, the boycott of Cuba has taken on
something of a holy mission. It represents the central organizing
principle of the Miami exile elite, and as such is central to that elite's
continued control over the nearly one million Cubans who now live in
the United States and especially in South Florida. Perversely, of course,
the boycott of Cuba most likely entrenches President Castro's regime.
Having a large external foe take you this seriously, and be willing to do
so much damage to the patrie, must indeed suggest that something is
being done right in Cuba and for Cubans.
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The United States has however decided that the value of
continuing the boycott far exceeds the boycott's role in entrenching the
Castro government. Of course, since it cannot be admitted that the
boycott exists primarily for domestic American political purposes, it
must be presented as a continuing moral obligation either to those whose
property was expropriated in Cuba some 40 years ago, or at the very
least, as a moral crusade against contemporary injustice and lack of
democracy in Cuba. None of this sits very well with Europeans who find
it a hollow, shallow, and hypocritical policy on the part of the United
States given the readiness of the United States to engage massively in
trade with China and even Vietnam, to name only two former dictatorial
regimes. Indeed it can easily be argued that Cuba is nowhere nearly as
repressive a country or regime as China, but rather that it is only a
smaller and weaker one and hence more easily manhandled. A stable
boycott of Cuba would take its place in the international order without at
this late date arousing much additional attention.
In 1996 however, Congress, in its infinite wisdom, passed the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, commonly known as the
Helms-Burton Act named after two of the most conservative and
residually anti-communist members of the Congress. As Rodriguez
makes clear, it is Title III of the Act that destabilizes the current
situation. Title I "creates a federal cause of action, on behalf of U.S.
citizens whose property was confiscated without compensation by Cuba,
against those who traffic in that property", etc. What this means is that a
cause of action now exists against European and other parties who may
be involved with property in Cuba that once had owners who are now
American citizens or descendants of such owners. Put somewhat
differently, the Helms-Burton Act creates a secondary boycott of Cuba
and seeks to punish those Europeans involved with nationalized
properties in Cuba. In one respect, this is an extraordinarily ironic
development. Of all Western countries, the United States is probably the
least sympathetic to the principle of secondary boycotts. If, for example,
workers striking Pepsi-Cola sought to preclude the arrival of Pepsi-Cola
products from independent supermarkets, the organizers of such a
secondary boycott would face rather stiff legal penalties. What Helms-
Burton proposes to do is precisely to extend the boycott to those who are
not involved in the U.S./Cuban conflict.
As Kinzel points out, Cuba offered to discuss nationalized
properties and the possibilities of compensation with United States
officials as part of an overall settlement of outstanding issues and
problems. Cuba sharply defends its policy of land and property
nationalizations undertaken during more radical phases in the
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Communist regime there. Nonetheless Cuba stands on the principle that
as an independent sovereign even one living in the shadow of the United
States, that it has a right to nationalized property with or without
compensation as it sees fit, and that when compensation is plausible, it is
to be a negotiated outcome by both parties.
The two authors take a subtle look at principles of boycott,
extraterritorial effect, political legitimacy, and legal rationale. Are there
other commitments to which the U.S and Europeans are party that might
preclude Helms-Burton and its effective reach? For example, GATT and
GATS might both affect the jurisdictional or territorial legitimacy of the
Act. It is nothing new for states to attempt to interfere in the internal
politics of others; what is striking about Helms-Burton is the explicitness
with which such efforts are undertaken, and the centrality of the political
advocates of that policy within the United States, a situation that
Rodriguez underscores.
Kara Davis of Miami next offers an essay on U.S. obligation to
lower greenhouse gas emissions. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in
1992 as a global effort to reduce greenhouse emissions. A large number
of states including the United States undertook at that time to work
together within a framework that would allocate emission quotas to
different states over an extended period of time. The larger goal is to
reduce both the gross quantity of emissions and to redistribute those
emissions away from the more glutinous developed countries such as the
United States and Europe toward the developing countries and regions of
the world to which much industrial production has shifted in the last 30
to 40 years. European unhappiness with America's failure to follow
through on its Kyoto commitment is manifest and widespread. Davis
acknowledges that the issue goes beyond emissions themselves. To be
sure, the U.S. uses approximately Y4 of all the energy used in the world
while representing a very small fraction of that in population terms.
Beyond the question of gluttony however, is the question of cooperation
versus going solo. It angers Europeans, as Davis also acknowledges, that
politicians in the United States have been able to mobilize rejection of
international standards in order to further their own careers. This area of
contention may be less urgent than matters of war and peace, but the
blatancy of America's desire to go it alone and to go it the American way
is most offensive to Europeans and perhaps dangerous to the future
environmental standards of the world as a whole.
Davis analyzes America's obligation to do something to lower
emissions and the dangers they pose to the planet as a whole while
defending the choice of the U.S. government to withdraw from the
obligations anticipated in the Kyoto Protocol. It is impossible to
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understand European unhappiness about developments in regard to Iraq
or the Middle East generally without appreciating the role of slights such
as that represented by the current American position on the Kyoto
accords. Davis makes clear how rankling these policies are and yet also
makes clear that the United States is in a position to pursue its own
environmental agenda, one whose content does not necessarily conflict
with the Kyoto agreements.
Robert Gregg of Miami explores another area in which
European/American differences are striking. The United States is the last
self-described democracy to maintain and employ capital punishment.
Europeans pride themselves on having abolished what they see as a relic
of an inegalitarian and unenlightened society and to have substituted for
capital punishment, more ambitious measures of individual reform, re-
integration, and rehabilitation. For whatever reasons, and they are
several, the United States adheres to the position that its member states
may employ capital punishment as a deterrent and as an act of vengeance
against those who have ripped asunder the fabric by committing heinous
crimes. Though it may be that democratic societies like the United States
are more likely to punish their members so severely, than are societies
that are more paternalistic in their social organization, it is nevertheless
the fact that by now among democracies only the United States adheres
to the position that capital punishment is neither cruel nor unusual. Gregg
explores these themes both as a historical and legal matter and attempts
to establish the differences between Europe and the United States which
have brought us to this current divide. Gregg defends the American
practice in legal terms and in terms of state sovereignty, while respecting
the rights of other countries, cultures, and societies to differ on this
matter. As fairly as he can, Gregg explains why the situation in the
United States is what it is and why Americans feel entitled to maintain
this position regardless of how isolated we are in doing so.
Let us look next it what seems to be a relatively minor issue
involving relatively minor people, namely adherence to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Notification. The Convention requires that
individuals arrested abroad be notified by the authorities holding them of
their right to see a representative of the embassy of their home country.
Alas, in the past several years, two or more Germans, Italians, and other
foreigners have been arrested, tried and even punished without being
apprised of this right. To be sure, the Germans and Italians in question
were not particularly attached to Germany or Italy, but the United States
state officials, in whose custody they sat, were aware of their foreign
citizenship yet nonetheless made no effort to contact the consulates of
their countries. This is particularly significant because Germany and Italy
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have repealed the death penalty, and that was precisely the penalty which
their nationals faced, and in at least one case were subjected to, here in
the United States. Arrogance, ignorance, hubris, whatever lay behind the
decision on the part of the state and federal officials in the United States
to ignore the Vienna Convention on Consular Notification, whatever the
reasoning, however unappealing the felons involved, this course of
action has left Europeans with a very bitter taste.
European agreements with the United States on extradition are
likewise implicated in the Miami-Leipzig debates. The United States
leaves the death penalty to individual states, and there is a limited federal
death penalty at this time as well. European countries, having abolished
the death penalty, refuse to extradite people to the United States on those
occasions where they may face the death penalty. From the American
perspective, this course of action contradicts obligations in individual
extradition agreements where there is no provision made for different
policies toward the death penalty. The American position is that treaties
should be renegotiated but not violated. To the Europeans and
particularly to the cultural elites, the insistence on the death penalty,
particularly in the state of which the president was the governor, and in
the state of which the president's brother is the governor, the persistence
and relentless use of the death penalty in those two states mark the
barbarity of America or at least of the American political elite. Given
that the abolition of the death penalty in Europe generally took place in
the context of anti- and post-fascist reform, American insistence on
employing the death penalty demonstrates that European societies are
now more democratic and progressive than the America that earlier
liberated them and instructed them in liberal democracy. Compared to
the violence of the death penalty, the violation of extradition obligations
can only appear a minor and perhaps justifiable breach.
In the next essay, Marc Kleiner discusses bananas, airplanes and
the World Trade Organization the question of subsidies.
Of all the significant countries of the northern hemisphere, the
United States is by far the most committed to free market capitalism.
Ideologically, Americans proclaim the principle of sink or swim,
proclaim the principle of let the market decide. Europeans on the other
hand, often view economics as a social matter, and economic success and
economic failure must be conditioned and even measured by social needs
and social requirements. Hence, Europe is in almost all respects a much
more insured society. And that insurance covers the entire range from
individual health insurance and welfare insurance to the policy of
protecting agricultural production, subsidizing farmers of all sorts both
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domestically and in the export market, and offering subventions to both
businesses and labor organizations involved in a range of production.
Such protection and subsidy is not only afforded agriculture or
decaying heavy industry; it is also extended to successful novel ventures,
like Airbus Industries. Airbus Industries has become a very viable and
strong competitor to the American aircraft industry. That American
aircraft industry once had several significant players. At present
however, it is overwhelmingly dominated by one player, Boeing
Industries. Boeing has seen its market shares reduced significantly in the
last decade by effective competition from Airbus Industries. Without
question Airbus is subsidized by European governments. The subsidy, or
subvention policy, has raised hackles in the United States on the grounds
that it represents unfair competition. The European response to this claim
is to argue that Boeing is also subsidized, but it is subsidized indirectly.
Namely, it is subsidized through a defense industry and a research and
development mechanism in the United States in which public costs are
funneled through military expenditures and then returned to domestic
producers in the form of improved technology. To Europeans, the
differences are minor. But in the eyes of most Americans, the indirect
subventions of this sort to Boeing are either invisible or do not count.
At the consumer subvention end, some European countries are
committed to furthering the economies of their former colonies; for
example, places like the French Caribbean, the British South American
coast, French, Central and North Africa. The result has become known as
the "Mini-Banana War". Some Central American producers, not former
British or French colonies, find that their efforts to export into the
European market are rendered more difficult by the subsidies being paid
to competitors. Now this might provide good reason for Honduras, or
Mexico, or Salvador to complain, but why does the United States
complain on behalf of those countries? From the European perspective,
such American complaints are disingenuous. They are not made bona
fide in the name of the peasants of Honduras for example, but rather in
the name of multinational American companies such as United Fruit,
Chiquita, etc., operating in the Spanish speaking lands of Central
America.
Although most of the contributions in this volume reflected a
European unease with the American way of doing business the Leipzig-
Miami discussions reflected precisely the opposite situation in regard to
the "abduction" of children by separated parents. Under the Hague
Convention, the jurisdiction in which international child custody disputes
are to be settled is determined by that Convention, ratified in 1980.
Primarily effecting separated couples engaged in nasty controversies
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over the custody of their children, the convention stipulates that custody
cases are to be heard in the jurisdiction of the child's conventional abode.
Parents who feel that they will not get the better of the case in the
jurisdiction in which they currently reside, have on occasion been known
to abduct their children and take them out of the country to their own
home countries, in order to do better there in the local courts.
Ximena Skovron looks at the existing cases involving citizens of
the United States and citizens of Europe, Germany in particular, to
examine the reluctance of European and especially German courts to
recognize their obligations under the Hague Convention. Far more
children are permitted to stay with the abducting parent in Germany than
ought to be the case. German courts appear to consider it inherently in
the best interest of a German child to remain in Germany. Hence all a
German parent needs to do is bring the child to the country and the
child's continued presence in that country will be assured. This seems to
fly in the face of the obligation to hear the case and judge the case in the
country of the child's abode, more often the United States. In the eyes of
most American analysts, this German reluctance to adhere to the Hague
Convention reflects the arrogant proposition that German culture and
German society must be better for any child with a half German
background than life in the United States. Alternatively, it reflects the
suspicion that American courts will not treat foreign parents fairly. Such
suspicion, of course, is not entirely unknown in the United States either.
Two or three years ago, when Elian Gonzalez arrived in Miami, relatives
and supposed supporters did not consider it even remotely possible that
Cuba, the place where Elian lived with his divorced parents, would be
the appropriate place to settle any disagreement between Elian's distant
relatives in Miami and his father in Cuba. Notwithstanding such unusual
cases as Elian's, Americans have reconciled themselves to the notion that
jurisdiction in child custody matters belongs in the child's place of
habitual residence. Skovron shows the courts of Europe and the
administrative agencies of Germany in particular wrestling with this
matter and perhaps coming to grips with it as well.
The next and final area of contention discussed so far in the
Miami-Leipzig seminars is the question of so-called hate speech on the
Internet. The American legal model, as applied so far to the Internet,
derives from America's libertarian commitments. According to these
commitments, free expression, free speech, and maximum latitude are to
be the norm. Any deviation from the free speech norm, whether in the
area of hate speech, racial incitement, pornography, or racist group
insult, must be very strictly limited. European societies on the hand, and
perhaps especially Germany, have had the experience in this past century
VOL. 10
FoREwoRD
of extreme right wing regimes availing themselves of the opportunity
offered by free speech to undermine the very foundation of free speech
and indeed of freedom and democracy itself. This has led to a much more
social and much less libertarian attitude towards speech that incites.
It is, for example, illegal in Germany and in France to deny the
existence of Nazi gas chambers, to deny the existence of the Nazi final
solution, to promote racial or religious incitement and discord. In the
United States it has proven virtually impossible for public authorities to
regulate speech in a comparable way. Occasionally one does see so-
called voluntary speech codes on university campuses in the United
States, but these are overwhelmingly matters involving private
universities. Even so, they are treated with considerable suspicion and
regularly denounced. As Joshua Spector amply demonstrates in his fine
contribution, the Internet is a new terrain and one which needs to be
approached cautiously and with adequate deliberation. Spector quite
wisely avoids taking an extreme position on this matter while comparing
German angst with American confidence in the area of Internet speech.
Spector works by examining first the Constitutional jurisprudence of free
speech in both Germany and the United States, and then seeking to apply
that jurisprudence to the novel area of Internet speech. It is certainly
clear by now that the early vision of the Internet as a self-governing, self-
regulating community of participants must be abandoned. Such an image
is no longer adequate for describing the concerted and concentrated
resources available to some of those who buy, sell, and organize through
the Internet. Self-regulation now would strengthen those who are
already strongly represented in Internet property matters while perhaps
filtering out those minor players who are responsible for a great deal of
the hate speech on the Internet. Self-regulation according to Spector
might therefore be adequate for organizations such as Yahoo, E-bay, and
others to restrict, for example, the sale of Nazi paraphernalia, or neo-
Nazi refutations of WWII genocide, etc. On the other hand, it may be the
case that it is precisely small and unpopular voices which need to be
protected. This is at the root of the most liberal of American
jurisprudence, which has .always been more comfortable regulating
commercial speech than political speech, religious speech, etc. The
American position, however, stands rather powerless before the racist
and other hate speech that pervades the Internet airwaves. Unlike
published materials, it is much more difficult to ascertain the nationality
or jurisdiction of materials appearing internationally on the Internet.
Therefore, the jurisdictional issues become as important as the actual
substantive principles underlying national law on speech and incitement.
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France and other European countries have, for example,
attempted to halt the distribution or reception, or downloading of hate
speech from the French transmitters of international or multinational hate
speech materials. Deciding where such speech is coming from, that is to
say, what country is responsible for determining the legitimacy and
legality of such speech, is no easy matter. It has become so easy to
camouflage and misidentify the origin of Internet transmissions that no
single national jurisdiction can be imputed to any transmission. As with
so many U.S.- German controversies, there is no easy solution to this
one. Somewhere between the libertarian and perhaps excessively relaxed
American standard and the more socially-minded German and European
standard a compromise that resides among Internet distributors but which
is overseen by national governments will undoubtedly come into being.
The Miami-Leipzig seminars provided a forum for in-depth
discussion of a number of relevant issues of international law among
students of diverse legal and cultural backgrounds. Although these
disputes are not likely to be resolved in the near future, debates such as
these encourage critical political thought and hopefully, improve the
level of understanding among citizens who will shape the legal landscape
in the years to come.
VOL. 10
